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ABSTRACT—If a litigated patent has previously been licensed to a third party, 
the courts generally adopt the terms of the prior agreement as the best measure of 
damages.  However, while administratively convenient, this “licensing-based 
damages” standard creates problematic incentives and undermines the efficient 
commercialization of patented inventions.  It rests on the trivialized (and generally 
false) presumption that a patent license is like a commodity, with the patentee 
charging a common price to all comers.  As a consequence, patentees distort their 
future recovery prospects—and, by extension, the outcomes of future licensing 
negotiations—whenever they license their patents, whether or not today’s 
agreement will be a good proxy for tomorrow’s dealings or disputes.  Knowing this, 
patentees are discouraged from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate, 
even if they could reach many additional mutually beneficial agreements on more 
modest terms.  The result is that patent holders rationally cut off the bottom segment 
of the licensing market, creating substantial deadweight loss.  This injures not only 
patentees but also prospective licensees and their consumers.  The standard creates 
additional problems by encouraging secrecy and gamesmanship in patent 
licensing.  
 
 We propose that the licensing-based damages standard be abandoned and that 
damages should generally be awarded ad hoc.  This does not mean that private 
parties should ignore comparable licenses in their private dealings; it simply 
means that courts should not use them as a measure of damages.  That this 
necessitates some speculation does not suggest it is the less desirable approach, for 
it is better that damages be somewhat random than systematically harmful.  
Further, while the licensing-based damages standard is easy to apply, there is little 
reason to believe it is accurate in the typical case.  As such, its apparent lack of 
randomness does not suggest that it is producing good results. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 As a first principle, the role of patent damages is to compensate patentees for 
past or future infringement.  But this simplistic characterization provides little 
guidance for constructing effective remedial standards.  The truth is that patent 
remedies are far less consequential within the courtroom than outside of it.  Private 
dealings vastly outnumber litigated disputes,1 but they all occur in the proverbial 
“shadow of litigation.”  Incentives to invent are similarly colored by expectations 
about the remedies that support patent enforcement.  And these expectations are 
formed by observing the calculus with which the courts compute damages.  Thus, 
as a policy issue, what matters most is not the number of dollars awarded in a 
particular case, but rather the legal standard used to choose that amount.  Such 
standards have a substantial impact on the private exchange of patent rights and 
should therefore be viewed as an important policy lever for encouraging the 
efficient dissemination and commercialization of patented technologies.   
 
 This article addresses a particularly problematic standard for computing patent 
damages—which we call “licensing-based damages.”  Under this standard, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 
2005, at 75, 75 (noting that less than 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, and only .1% ever reach 
trial). 
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damages are based on the monetary terms of prior licensing agreements involving 
the litigated patent.  We are particularly interested in damages awards based on 
prior agreements in which the present plaintiff licensed the now-disputed patent.  
The licensing-based damages standard is perhaps best known as the first of the 
fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors,2 which provide guidance for computing patent 
damages consisting in a “reasonable royalty.”3  However, its use dates back as far 
as the late 19th century.4   
 
 Today, licensing-based damages are commonly used in disputes involving 
patents that have been licensed in the past.5  The courts tend to view this standard 
as not only convenient, but also accurate.  For instance, the Federal Circuit has 
remarked that, “[w]here an established royalty for the patented invention is shown 
to exist, that rate will usually be adopted as the best measure of reasonable and 
entire compensation.”6  In the courts’ view, the royalty rate from a prior agreement 
is a strong indicator of what the defendant in suit would have paid for the same 
rights.  Indeed, it is thought to “remove the need to guess at the terms to which the 
parties would hypothetically agree.”7  The implication is that the defendant would 
have paid the same amount as the prior licensee, notwithstanding that the litigants 
reached no such agreement on their own. 
 
 The problem with licensing-based damages is that they tether patentees to the 
terms of their prior dealings, and this distorts both litigation outcomes and licensing 
behavior in a number of harmful ways.  Perhaps the most serious problem is that it 
undermines efficient patent licensing and hence prevents patented inventions from 
being efficiently disseminated and commercialized.8  When a patentee licenses its 
patent, this standard forces it to hedge against the possible future consequences of 
the present agreement on its future dealings and disputes.  This discourages patent 
holders from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate—even if additional 
                                                 
2 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), mod. and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing “the royalties received by [the plaintiff] 
for licensing the patent, proving or tending to prove an established royalty” as the first of fifteen 
factors for computing reasonable royalties). 
3 35 U.S.C. § 284 (INSERT YEAR) (“[T]he court shall award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”).  The most 
common interpretation of the reasonable royalty is that it equals what the parties would have 
agreed to in a counterfactual arm’s length licensing negotiation.  E.g., Mark Lemley, 
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 661 (2009). 
4 See, e.g., Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (“It is a general rule in patent cases that 
established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be used.”). 
5 See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Damages, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 120 
(2015) (“Courts have relied upon existing licenses in calculating damages for decades, and the 
practice has grown even more prominent in recent years.”). 
6 Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
7 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
8 For the related proposition that this damages standard is unlikely to provide an accurate measure 
of harm, see Masur, supra note 5, at 120 (“[T]here is doubt as to whether existing licenses can 
provide reliable evidence of reasonable royalty damages.”). 
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mutually beneficial agreements could be reached at lower rates—due to the fear 
that anything less would weaken its patent by limiting its future recovery.   
 
 This is in stark contrast to the way agreements are normally formed.  Ideally, 
both parties to a deal would view their transaction as an isolated event that will not 
bind them in future dealings or disputes with third parties.  This is the logic that 
underpins the privity of contract doctrine.  But the licensing-based damages rule 
makes this impossible.  For example, suppose a patentee would like to license to 
some “fringe competitors,” which present only a nominal commercial threat, but 
not to its primary rival.  Licensing is virtually always welfare-enhancing, so this 
outcome would be efficient.  But the licensing-based damages standard may 
prevent it from happening, and may instead lead the patentee to refuse to license to 
anyone.  Indeed, an agreement with a fringe competitor would create a false 
inference that the patentee would have willingly licensed to its primary rival at the 
same rate.  This may be an unacceptable risk, leading the patent holder to rationally 
(albeit reluctantly) refuse to license with anyone. 
 
 The patentee is concerned not only with adversely impacting its future litigation 
prospects, but also with the fees it can earn in future licensing.  If the patent holder 
were to license at a modest royalty rate, the resulting limitation on future recovery 
provides a bargaining chip with which future licensees may secure lower fees than 
they would otherwise pay.  Thus, because patent holders are concerned with 
keeping their patents as strong as possible, they will be reluctant to strike any 
licensing deals that might undermine the perceived value of their patents.   
 
 One inherent problem with the licensing-based damages standard is that it 
reflects a trivialized view of patent rights as commercial objects.  It treats them like 
commodities, such as grain or lumber, that are always sold to everyone at a common 
price.  But in fact there are many variables that would tend to create a disparity in 
the licensing terms reached in different agreements.  Section II provides a 
comprehensive list of such factors.  For example, many patented inventions can be 
applied in a number of different ways or within different kinds of products, which 
vary in their commercial value.  Alternatively, the royalty rate in a licensing 
agreement may reflect factors that have nothing to do with patent value; for 
example, a high royalty rate may be used essentially as a financing device, allowing 
a pre-revenue licensee to avoid paying a large lump sum and instead pay as she 
goes. 
 
 Due to the many variables that influence the terms of licensing agreements, 
price discrimination—charging different royalty rates to different licensees—
becomes an essential condition for efficiency in patent licensing markets.  If patent 
holders feel obligated to stick to a fixed price for all licensees, then they may forgo 
many mutually beneficial deals that could only be reached on more modest terms.  
That is to say, rigid pricing will produce deadweight loss, which is a well-
understood problem in economics.  Thus, ideally patent holders would feel free to 
price discriminate—to charge low royalties to low-value licensees and high 
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royalties to high-value licensees.  Furthermore, unlike many consumer products, 
the value of a patent license is usually high in relation to the relevant transaction 
costs, making it generally feasible for a patentee to price discriminate through ad 
hoc negotiations with different licensees.  But the licensing-based damages 
standard discourages them from doing this.  It induces them to strike only the most 
lucrative licensing deals and thereby keep the royalty rate high, even if additional, 
valuable deals could be reached at lower rates. 
 
 The problems with licensing-based damages extend beyond the disincentive 
they create for price discrimination.  If licenses can reduce the amount of damages 
a patent owner will receive at trial—and thus reduce the amount of future licenses 
as well—patent owners have incentives to conceal or obscure the licensing deals 
they have struck.  They might couple licenses with other goods such as trademarks 
or trade secrets that the licensee does not really want or need in an attempt to render 
the licenses less useful to courts as guides to damages.  Or they might simply 
attempt to conceal the license using confidentiality agreements and prevent it from 
ever reaching the public.  These tactics, whichever form they take, will likely 
increase transaction costs, make settlements less likely, and obscure information 
that could function as a public good.  Courts’ misuse of licensing-based damages 
can thus do violence to the IP-licensing ecosystem. 
 
 In light of the foregoing conclusions, we propose that the licensing-based 
damages standard be abandoned and that courts instead award damages ad hoc, on 
the basis of the value of the technology to the infringer.9  This does not mean that 
comparable licenses should not have any influence on the parties.  On the contrary, 
assessments of comparable licenses are quite helpful in private licensing 
negotiations, and they should be considered in this context.  What we suggest, by 
contrast, is that the courts should not rely on the terms of a prior licensing deal as a 
measure of the plaintiff’s damages.  That standard treats any licensing agreement 
as an implicit commitment by the patentee to accept the stipulated royalty rate as 
the measure of damages in all future disputes, and this systematically distorts 
private behavior in licensing markets.  
 
 In principle, there may be some situations in which the licensing-based damages 
standard is appropriate, or at least less harmful.  This may be so if the patentee has 
widely licensed the infringed patent on nondiscriminatory terms.10  However, as 
we will show, the standard is still likely to produce an inapt measure of damages in 
this situation, at least if there was pre-judgment uncertainty as to whether the 
plaintiff would prevail in court.  The prior royalty rate, while stable over time, 
reflected uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff would win.  If the court applies this 
                                                 
9 See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 
79 (2014) (advocating this type of approach). 
10 In particular, this may be so if the patent is very widely licensed at a common rate.  For example, 
some patentees make a commitment to license their patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
(RAND) terms.  These commitments are often applied to patents that are essential to an adopted 
technology standard, in which case they will be licensed by most or all firms who products read on 
the standard.  See note 18, infra. 
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royalty rate as-is, it implicitly discounts the patentee’s recovery to reflect that 
uncertainty, notwithstanding that it has just eliminated all uncertainty by holding 
the patent valid and infringed.  We show that this will lead to systematic under-
compensation over time, assuming that ad hoc damages (expectations of which 
determine the terms in the first agreement) are accurate in expected value. 
 
 The arguments in the prior paragraph also explain why it is not enough to 
demand that courts be more careful to ensure that the relied-upon agreements are 
sufficiently “comparable.”  Even if the commercial circumstances are largely 
equivalent, the fact that the prior agreements were reached under uncertainty 
suggests that they are generally an inaccurate measure of damages.  More generally, 
damages should not be based on economic data that have not been distorted by the 
parties’ expectations about what damages will be.  Doing so creates a circularity 
problem that undermines efficiency in licensing markets.      
 
 Econometrics has a term for the bias created by this kind of circularity problem: 
endogeneity.11  In effect, endogeneity means that that the modeler—or, in our case, 
the courts—is relying on a mistaken conception of how some causal relationship 
actually works.  When the courts apply the licensing-based damages standard, the 
endogeneity problem is the following: the court believes that economic factors 
alone are shaping licensing terms, and that only these terms are in turn shaping 
future damages awards.  The court thus presumes that economic factors alone are 
shaping its damages awards.  But in fact the licensing-based damages standard has 
a causal effect on future licensing terms, and this effect is not related to any 
economic factors relevant to the agreement in question.  This, by extension, means 
that licensing terms are not actually a good measure of damages because they are 
distorted by the courts’ remedial standards.  An ironic corollary is that licensing 
terms are actually less reliable as a proxy for harm than they would be if the 
licensing-based damages standard did not exist. 
 
 This Article proceeds in four additional Parts.  In Part II, we describe the 
operation of a healthy patent licensing market.  In Part III, we explain how courts’ 
use of licensing-based damages can lead to artificial reductions in the damages 
awarded at trial, and thus to artificial reductions in future licensing revenue as well.  
In Part IV, which is the heart of the paper, we describe the effects of these 
distortions on the licensing market.  We explain that patent owners will be less 
inclined to price discriminate, that they will attempt to bundle patent licenses with 
unnecessary other goods in order to render licenses less transparent, and that in 
many cases they will simply hide licenses behind confidentiality agreements.  Part 
V concludes with some tentative policy recommendations. 
 
                                                 
11 KEVIN D. HOOVER, CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, 2d Ed. 2008, (Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds.) (providing an overview 
of endogeneity and causality in economic analysis).  Available at 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000569.  
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II. PATENT LICENSING MARKETS 
 
 For every patent, there is a potential licensing market in which the patent holder 
may sell the rights to make, use, or sell technologies covered by the patent.  As with 
any other market, we would like a licensing market to operate efficiently, meaning 
that no possible mutually beneficial transactions are foregone.12  In addition to 
benefitting both licensing parties, these transactions create a positive externality in 
the form of enhanced consumer welfare in the licensee’s product market.  Indeed, 
a licensee desires a license precisely because it will allow it to offer a new, 
improved, or less expensive product to its consumers, allowing it to capture 
additional profits while also improving consumer welfare.  And of course a patentee 
benefits from mutually beneficial licensing by definition, so a healthy licensing 
market only strengthens the incentive to invent.   Thus, by encouraging both the 
development and the dissemination of new inventions, an efficient licensing market 
allows society to have its cake and eat it too. 
 
 Although the principal ambition of the patent system is to promote innovation, 
it clearly has a secondary interest in encouraging the dissemination and 
commercialization of patented inventions through efficient patent licensing.  
Because all patent licensing occurs “in the shadow of litigation,” patent remedies 
play a prominent role in shaping licensing behavior.  Most patentees will never 
actually receive a remedy (because most patents are never litigated),13 but beliefs 
about patent remedies influence virtually all patent licensing.  Thus, expectations 
about damages do most of the work, and these expectations are formed principally 
by the general rules that courts use to calculate damages.  For a licensing market to 
achieve efficiency, these rules must shape incentives in such a way that patent 
holders are not discouraged from licensing. 
 
 Many patents could be licensed on mutually beneficial terms to at least some 
prospective user.14  This is particularly likely when technologies are complex and 
can be applied in a number of different kinds of products.  For example, mutually 
beneficial licensing is always possible if the patented technology can be usefully 
applied by firms that do not compete with the patent holder.  The extreme case, 
which is now quite common, arises when the patent holder is a non-practicing entity 
that sells no products and thus does not compete with anyone.15   
 
                                                 
12 Mutually beneficial licensing is possible when a potential licensee values the use of the patented 
invention more than the patent holder values the exclusion of the licensee’s use. 
13 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 75.  
14 Here, and throughout this paper, we focus on patents with legitimate commercial value.  
However, there are many patents that do not have commercial value, in which case there are no 
prospective users willing to pay for a license.  See, e.g., THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE 
PATENT REMEDIES 46 (2013) (“[M]any patents have little or no commercial value. . . .”). 
15 A non-practicing entity is a firm that owns and enforces patents, but does not actually 
manufacture any products that rely on them.  E.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglass Melamed, 
Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118 (2013). 
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 Even if a prospective user is a competitor, however, licensing may benefit the 
competitor more than it hurts the patent holder.  In such a case, the parties can still 
reach a mutually beneficial deal, notwithstanding that it provides a boost to the 
patentee’s rival.  For example, if the parties’ products are sufficiently differentiated, 
then competition will not be too fierce, in which case the patentee may not face 
serious injury by selling a license.  Another obvious explanation is the availability 
of non-infringing alternative technologies.  If a rival licensee has a viable 
alternative option, then licensing may be in the patentee’s best interest, even if its 
first choice would be to exclude the licensee from the market altogether.  After all, 
the alternative technology might impact competition in substantially the same way, 
but it would not entitle the patentee to collect licensing fees.16  As this analysis 
demonstrates, mutually beneficial licensing is legitimately impossible only if (1) 
all possible licensing applications would substantially increase the degree of 
competition faced by the patent holder; and (2) prospective licensees do not have 
reasonably viable alternatives to the patented technology.17   
 
 At the time a patent is granted, the patent holder is the only party with the right 
to use the patented invention.  To the extent that mutually beneficial licensing is 
possible, this initial allocation of patent rights is inefficient.  Ronald Coase 
famously pointed out the significance of the initial allocation of property rights in 
markets where, for one reason or another, the relevant parties may not be able to 
transact efficiently.18  He noted that 
 
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency 
with which the economic system operates.  One arrangement of rights may 
bring about a greater value of production than any other.  But unless this 
is the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of 
reaching the same result by altering and combing rights through the 
market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights . . . may 
never be achieved.19 
 
 Coase focused on transaction costs as the principal threat to market efficiency.  
But more generally the threat could be anything that gets in the way of efficient 
trade, such as a legal rule that discourages efficient patent licensing.  And the courts 
may create such an incentive when they tether patentees to the terms of their prior 
dealings with nonparty licensees—a result that injures patentees, prospective 
licensees, and consumers. 
 
A.  ANATOMY OF AN EFFICIENT LICENSING MARKET 
 
                                                 
16 A similar possibility arises if the prospective licensee has a reasonably strong argument that the 
patent is invalid, in which case the alternative to licensing might be litigation resulting in the 
patent’s invalidation.  Here too licensing to a rival may be preferable to the alternative. 
17 This is most likely to occur in situations where the patented technology essentially constitutes 
the final product all by itself, such as a patented pharmaceutical compound. 
18 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960). 
19 Id. 
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 In order to determine how standards for computing damages are likely to impact 
licensing markets, the first question to ask is how a well-functioning licensing 
market would operate in a typical case.  For example, what factors determine the 
license fees in a particular case?  How consistent are the terms and scope of 
different transactions for the same licensing rights?  This section addresses these 
issues and demonstrates that, for a number of reasons, patent licensing markets tend 
to be more complex and irregular than conventional product markets. 
 
 Some markets, such as the market for toasters, are quite simple.  They involve 
very little variability among the terms or scope of different transactions.  All buyers 
of a particular model will receive exactly the same toaster, and they will all use it 
for the same purpose: making toast.  Further, because transaction costs are high in 
relation to transaction value, the manufacturer will set a fixed price, and all buyers 
will pay exactly that amount.  Thus, if the price of the toaster is fixed at $10, then 
we can safely presume this is the same amount that any counterfactual buyer would 
have been made to pay for it. 
 
 For other kinds of products, such as home remodeling, the market is much less 
consistent, with comparatively little similarity among different transactions.  A 
typical contractor may remodel a hundred homes, but he is probably not asked to 
do exactly the same thing in any two cases.  Thus not all customers are receiving 
the same thing.  Similarly, because some remodels are more elaborate or difficult 
than others, the price level will vary from one transaction to the next.  A home 
renovator will not charge a fixed amount to all customers but will instead negotiate 
a custom agreement with each customer.  As such, it is largely impossible to 
identify an “established price” in the market for home renovations. 
 
 When courts rely on licensing-based damages, they implicitly treat patent 
licenses like toasters; they presume that the price paid by one licensee is a strong 
predictor of what any other licensee would pay for the same rights.  But the truth is 
that patent rights are much more complex, and in fact they tend to act more like 
home renovations.20  There are many important variables, discussed in detail below, 
that will tend to affect the terms of trade with different prospective licensees.  If the 
patent holder simply charged a fixed price to everyone, many potential licensees 
would simply refuse to license.  This is the case even if the parties could reach a 
mutually beneficial agreement at a lower price.  Furthermore, much like a home 
renovation, the value of a licensing transaction is usually high in relation to 
                                                 
20 A prominent exception is a licensing market for a standards-essential patent: a patent whose 
claimed technology must be used by any product that comports with a particular technological 
standard.  Such patents are very widely-licensed, and frequently the patent holders pledge that they 
will be licensed on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) terms, which will involve setting 
a common royalty rate for all licensees.  See, e.g., Scott J. Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and 
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 353 (2007).   
In these cases, the licensing market looks more like a conventional product market. 
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transaction costs, enabling patent holders to bargain individually with licensees.21  
Thus, within patent licensing markets, price discrimination—the practice of 
charging different prices to different customers22 —is generally a necessary and 
feasible way of achieving market efficiency.23  Yet by treating patent rights like 
commodities, the courts inadvertently discourage price discrimination and, by 
extension, the efficient licensing of patented inventions.  We address this issue in 
greater detail below. 
 
 Intuitively, if there is a diverse set of prospective licensees, then it is unlikely 
that linear pricing—charging the same price to everyone—will achieve market 
efficiency.  In such a case, the patent holder will have to charge different prices to 
different buyers.  In the extreme case the patent holder would engage in “first 
degree” or “perfect” price discrimination, meaning that it charges each potential 
licensee a price that is exactly equal to its willingness to pay for a license, which 
would reach an efficient result by eliminating deadweight loss.24  However, it is not 
actually necessary that the patent holder gets all of the trade surplus in every 
transaction; as a matter of efficiency, it is just as well (and certainly more equitable) 
for the patent holder to bargain individually with all prospective licensees, in each 
case choosing a price that leaves both parties better off.25  In what follows we refer 
to this more general variety of price discrimination as discriminatory bargaining.   
 
 The differential welfare effects of linear pricing and discriminatory bargaining 
are easily seen in the juxtaposed graphs in Figure 1.  Here the top and bottom graphs 
correspond to linear pricing and discriminatory bargaining, respectively.  The x-
axis can be interpreted as the set of prospective licensees, arranged in decreasing 
order of their willingness to pay (WTP) for a license.   The dotted line in each graph 
                                                 
21 Another reason bargaining would tend to be feasible here is that a licensor may be able to 
determine how much value the licensee derives from the relevant patent rights by simply 
considering the licensing application and how it will affect the licensee’s product.  By contrast, if 
the relevant product is a toaster, there is a significant asymmetric information problem because the 
seller cannot generally predict the value a buyer places on the toaster. 
22 More accurately, price discrimination means a disparity in prices charged to different customers 
that is not explained by a corresponding disparity in the costs of supplying these different buyers.  
However, for our purposes it is sufficient simply to consider all situations that might induce a 
patent holder to charge different fees to different licensees.  That is, in what follows, “price 
discrimination” refers to any situation in which a patent holder receives different fees from 
different licensees of the same patent.  Note that, unless a firm always prices at marginal cost, 
price discrimination is always necessary to achieve economic efficiency.  However, due to high 
transaction costs, perfect price discrimination is almost never feasible. 
23 The concept of price discrimination was first introduced by economist Arthur Pigou.  See 
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 275–289 (1920).  For a modern overview of 
price discrimination and its effects, see Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
24 See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kurdle, The Law and Economics of Price 
Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation?  43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 
1241 (2010) (noting that first degree price discrimination eliminates deadweight loss). 
25 That is, all mutually beneficial deals are executed, but we make no assumption about how the 
parties split the licensing surplus in any given transaction.   
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gives the prices charged to these licensees.  A licensee will pay for a license only if 
its willingness to pay exceeds the price it is charged.  Linear pricing generates 
deadweight loss, which captures the forgone value of efficient deals that were not 
executed, because not all buyers have a WTP that exceeds the constant price level.   
 
 By contrast, under discriminatory bargaining, the price is lower for a licensee 
with a lower WTP, reflecting that bargaining allows the patent holder to tailor each 
license fee to the specific needs and preferences of the corresponding licensee.  The 
patent holder is able to transact with all prospective licensees, which achieves 
market efficiency.26  In each graph, market welfare (of the patent holder and its 
licensees) is given by the sum of the unshaded regions, CS (consumer surplus, 
which captures the welfare of licensees), and PS (producer surplus, which captures 
the welfare of the patent holder).  As the graphs reflect, market welfare is higher 
under discriminatory bargaining.  There is no deadweight loss in this case because 
no efficient transactions are forgone.  Accordingly, QDB > QLP, where the numbers 
QDB and QLP give the quantities of licenses sold under discriminatory bargaining 
and linear pricing, respectively.   
 
 The problem with linear pricing is that it cuts off the bottom segment of the 
market.  The only efficient linear price would be zero.  But the patent holder, which 
maximizes its own licensing receipts, would never set such a generous price.  This 
would give it a profit of zero.  Rather, just like an oligopolist in a conventional 
product market, the patent holder charges an inefficiently high price to everyone.  
Thus price discrimination is preferable for both licensees and the patent holder. 
 
 
                                                 
26 More accurately, the patent holder licenses to every prospective licensee with whom mutually 
beneficial licensing is possible.  As noted below, if a prospective user is a direct competitor, then 
there may be no licensing terms that would leave both parties better off. 
HOW PATENT DAMAGES SKEW LICENSING MARKETS Hovenkamp & Masur 
 
12 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Linear Pricing (Top) Versus Discriminatory Bargaining (Bottom) 
 
 There are a number of reasons why a typical patent holder would like to 
discriminate in the terms of different licensing transactions.  First, different 
licensees may not be willing to pay the same amount.  This is not only a function 
of the licensee’s characteristics.  It can also be a result of changes in the number of 
alternative technologies that are available, or of the circumstances under which a 
licensing agreement is reached.  Furthermore, a patent holder may have its own 
motivations for charging different amounts to different users.  In what follows, we 
illustrate some of the most important variables that will tend to affect the terms of 
trade, variables that are largely ignored when a court focuses myopically on prior 
licensing terms. 
 
(i) Alternative licensing applications.  Different licensees may intend to 
apply the patented technology in different ways, which may vary in the 
extent to which they enhance the licensees’ profits.  For example, suppose 
the patented technology is a spray-on coating that makes steel products 
more resistant to rust.  There are many product manufacturers that could 
benefit from this.  At one end of the spectrum, a licensee that manufactures 
mufflers for cars would receive substantial utility from the invention, for 
rust creates holes that prevent a muffler from functioning.  On the other 
hand, a licensee that produces sledgehammers derives much less value from 
the technology, implying it is not willing to pay nearly as much.  Rust does 
not impede the functionality of sledgehammers, so the benefit is merely a 
shinier sledgehammer.  Even though these two licensees have acquired the 
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same rights, they are paying for different kinds of product enhancements: 
the muffler maker is paying for improved functionality, while the 
sledgehammer maker is paying for an aesthetic improvement.  As this 
illustrates, a given patent license may represent very different things to 
different licensees. 
 
(ii) Obsolescence; increased competition in the licensing market.  In 
many cases, the value of a given patent license will depreciate over the 
patent term.27  There are two principal reasons for this.  First, the patented 
technology may grow obsolete over time, as it is gradually surpassed by 
more sophisticated or popular technologies.  For example, the digital video 
disk (DVD) was initially a very popular technology for storing movies for 
in-home viewing, but it is growing obsolete over time as improved 
technologies like Blu-ray and digital streaming have become more widely 
available.  A related problem is that although a technology may not grow 
obsolete in the sense that it becomes inferior, the licensing market may 
nevertheless grow more competitive over time.28  That is, as time passes, 
more and more viable alternatives may enter the licensing market.  And, of 
course, prices are lower in a more competitive market, implying that license 
fees will tend to fall as the field of competitors grows larger over time.  This 
means that the precedent set by a prior agreement may overstate the value 
of a license later in the patent term. 
 
(iii) Commercial relationship between the parties.  A licensing 
agreement benefits the patent holder only if it provides license fees in excess 
of the benefit it would get by excluding the licensee’s use.  And the value 
of such exclusion is larger when the licensee is a competitor.  Thus a patent 
holder will tend to charge larger license fees to firms with which it competes 
on some level.  So, for example, if a patent holder charges a rival a $10 per-
unit royalty and later sells this patent to a non-practicing entity (NPE), it 
does not follow that the NPE and a similar user would reach an agreement 
for the same $10 per unit.  On the other hand, if the patent holder and 
licensee sell complementary products—e.g. a smartphone operating system 
and smartphone apps—then the patent holder may be willing to accept a 
lower license fee, all else being equal.   
 
                                                 
27RICHARD A. POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW, 311–12 (2003). 
28 “Biosimilar” or “bioequivalent” pharmaceutical drugs are a good example.  These drugs mimic 
patented drugs without infringing their patents by using different molecules or compounds to 
achieve substantially the same results.  See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 
2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to hold that bioequivalent drug infringed pioneer patent under 
the doctrine of equivalents simply because it achieved similar therapeutic results); Acorda 
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Apotex, 2011 WL 4074116 at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011) (same); Adams 
Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining 
difference between conclusion that a drug is bioequivalent and analysis of infringement under 
doctrine of equivalents). 
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(iv) Invention around the patent.  A licensee is willing to pay less when 
it is more feasible to invent around the patent, or when the benefits of 
inventing around are larger.  Thus, if one licensee is much more 
technologically sophisticated than another, it would tend to be willing to 
pay less for a license as it is better equipped to invent around the patent.  
Similarly, all else being equal, invention around the patent is more valuable 
when there is more time remaining in the patent term.  The cost of inventing 
around the patent (a fixed cost) will be amortized over a larger number of 
sales.  Thus, all else being equal, a patent holder would tend to be willing 
to pay a larger royalty rate if there is less time remaining in the patent term, 
in which case invention around is less worthwhile.  
 
(v) Financial constraints.  Patent licensing agreements often call for the 
licensee to pay a two-part tariff: an initial lump sum in addition to a per-unit 
royalty on licensed sales.29  If a licensee is financially constrained at the 
time of agreement—say, because its business is not yet profitable and it 
does not have easy access to the capital markets—then it may be willing to 
pay a larger royalty in order to avoid paying a large lump sum.  Thus a high 
royalty may simply reflect a financing deal aimed at spreading out the 
licensee’s total obligations over time; if the deal instead involved a well-
heeled licensee, the royalty rate might be much lower, even if both of these 
licensees happen to get the same benefits from the license.  The same logic 
also applies in the other direction.  If the patent holder is in poor financial 
shape at the time of the agreement, it may be willing to accept a lower 
royalty in exchange for a larger upfront fee.  Here too this has nothing to do 
with the value of a license. 
 
(vi) Sunk-cost investments.  In some cases, the patent holder has some 
leverage over the licensee, enabling it to extract larger fees than it could 
have hoped to garner in an arm’s length bargain.  In particular, a licensee 
may begin developing a technology only to discover that it is already 
covered by an existing patent.  In such a case, the patent holder can extract 
the costs that have already been sunk in the technology by threatening to 
“hold up” the infringer30—an outcome it could not attain through ex ante 
bargaining.31  Accordingly, license fees will tend to be artificially high to 
                                                 
29  Michael D. Rostoker, PTC Research Report: A Survey of Corporate Licensing, 24 J.L. & TECH. 
59, 64 (1984) (analyzing data on patent licensing, and noting that 46% of agreements in the dataset 
involve both an upfront fixed fee and a per-unit royalty). 
30 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 2010 (2007) (“[T]he royalty negotiated in the shadow of litigation and holdup can 
significantly exceed the intrinsic value of the invention itself.”). 
31 For example, in the well-known Blackberry Case, the non-practicing entity NTP obtained an 
injunction against Research in Motion (RIM), the firm that makes Blackberry devices.  The 
devices used an email system that was held to infringe NTP’s patents.  But RIM had already made 
considerable sunk-cost investments in this particular system, and it would be very expensive to 
switch over to something else on short notice.  This holdup problem gave NTP leverage to extract 
HOW PATENT DAMAGES SKEW LICENSING MARKETS Hovenkamp & Masur 
 
15 
 
the extent that the licensee has already invested in using the patented 
technology.32  
 
(vii) Information externalities.  Because licensing terms are determined in 
the shadow of litigation, they will depend critically on the parties’ beliefs 
about how litigation would turn out.  Thus any new information that sheds 
light on this question may alter the terms of subsequent licensing.  For 
example, if a patent holder has already successfully litigated its patent, then 
it will tend to charge higher fees in subsequent licensing negotiations, all 
else being equal.  The parties update their beliefs based on what they learned 
from the lawsuit, and so a successful lawsuit will tend to shift expectations 
in favor of the patentee.  Alternatively, the establishment of a new legal 
precedent—say, a refinement of some relevant patent eligibility rules—may 
shed new light on whether the patent is likely to be held valid, and this too 
would tend to affect the licensing terms in subsequent negotiations.  
 
(viii) Uncertain value of a licensing application.  Related to the last point, 
at the time of contracting the patent holder and its prospective licensee may 
be uncertain as to how much value the patented invention will provide the 
licensee.  For example, it may be that the patented invention has not 
previously been applied in the way contemplated by the licensee.  As such, 
the royalty rate in the first licensing transaction would ordinarily be lower 
or higher than in subsequent agreements, depending on whether the 
application proves to have relatively low or high value.  For example, if the 
first application does better than expected, then subsequent licensees would 
ordinarily pay more for it, all else being equal. 
 
(ix) Patent complementarities.  If a licensee already has the rights to one 
or more patents that are complementary to the one being licensed, then it 
                                                 
a massive settlement worth more than $600M – about twenty times the amount that the lower 
court had awarded as damages.  See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785 
(E.D.  Va.  2005).  As numerous commenters have noted, this holdup problem allows the plaintiff 
to capture a much larger payoff than it could even have obtained in an arm’s length deal.  See, e.g., 
Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 28, at 2010. 
32 The courts already recognize an extreme case of this leverage problem.  In particular, if an 
independent inventor goes so far as to commence infringing sales by the time licensing negotiations 
commence—implying licensing is achieved under threat of litigation—then a court will typically 
place less evidentiary weight on this agreement when calculating damages in a later case.  See, e.g., 
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078–79 (Fed.Cir.1983) (noting that license 
fees set in settlement of an infringement action should not serve as a basis for damages, since they 
“may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full litigation”); Masur, supra note 5, at 124–25 
(“[C]ourts and commentators generally disfavor licenses that parties negotiated as settlements to 
ongoing litigation.”)  Paradoxically, however, some courts decline to adhere to this limitation 
despite acknowledging that it exists.  See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 2016 
WL 937220, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2016) (noting that settlements are generally not a good basis 
for damages, but nevertheless awarding damages based on a settlement, citing the fact that the 
settlement involved a patent that was “sufficiently comparable” to the patent in suit). 
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derives a larger marginal benefit from the license, all else being equal.  This 
could arise because the patented technologies are complementary in the 
sense that it is convenient to use them both simultaneously, or because the 
licensee has a patent that is blocked by the licensed patent.33  For example, 
suppose the licensee has a patent on an improved version of the technology 
covered by the licensor’s patent.  The licensee would be willing to pay not 
for the right to use the patentee’s inferior technology, but for the right to use 
its own superior version.  All else being equal, this licensee’s willingness to 
pay is higher than that of an alternative licensee who lacks any rights to the 
improvement.   
 
 As the above examples illustrate, there are many variables that shape the terms 
of a licensing agreement.  For a licensing market to operate efficiently, patent 
holders must not be discouraged from price discrimination when licensing to 
different licensees.  Of course, some (but not all) of the variables discussed above 
are already addressed in later Georgia-Pacific factors.  For example, factor five 
highlights the relevance of the commercial relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant, such as whether they sell competing or complementary products, as 
addressed in point (iii) above.34  But the point is that these factors, along with the 
other variables mentioned above, tend to undermine the appropriateness of factor 
one as the sole or primary basis for calculating patent damages. 
 
 
III.  COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF PATENT LICENSING  
 
 Ideally, a single instance of patent licensing would be an isolated event that 
binds only the parties, and only to the extent contemplated by their agreement.  In 
this case, licensing would not create disadvantages in future dealings or disputes 
arising outside the scope of the agreement.  But when courts rely on prior 
agreements as a basis for damages, they unwittingly tether patentees to the terms of 
their prior agreements, and consequently patent licensing may have some 
problematic repercussions. 
 
A.  REDUCED FUTURE DAMAGES 
 
 In Part II we described the many reasons why the licensing price agreed to by 
one licensee might not accurately reflect the value of the same patent to another 
licensee.  For a variety of reasons, patent owners might charge one licensee more 
or less than another, even for the same license to the same patent.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
33 Patent A blocks patent B if one cannot practice B without also practicing A.  This means that a 
licensee who wants to use the technology covered by B must obtain licenses for both patents.  See 
Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 
2659–60 (1994).  
34 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), mod. and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing “[t]he commercial relationship between 
the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors” as the fifth factor).    
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even at first blush the amount of a prior patent license may not provide an accurate 
guide to patent damages in a later case.  However, these types of errors will be 
random, rather than biased.  Sometimes the price of a license will be greater for the 
first licensee than the second; sometimes less.  If patent licenses introduced only 
random errors, rather than biases, into courts’ calculations of damages, these errors 
might be shrugged off as tolerable.  After all, it is not as if the available alternative 
methods for calculating damages are unerring. 
 
    Yet these are not the only or necessarily even the most severe distortions 
introduced by using prior licenses as guides to patent damages at trial.  The use of 
licenses to calculate damages also creates a downward bias on patent damages due 
simply to the probabilistic nature of patents.  When a patent owner and potential 
licensee negotiate a license, both parties are aware that there is some probability 
that the patent will be held invalid or not infringed if the parties’ dispute were to go 
to trial.  The two parties may not share the same view as to this probability, and 
they may not be able to estimate it with any great certainty.  But it is the very rare 
case in which either side can be certain that a court will find a patent valid and 
infringed.  In the vast majority of cases, there is some non-zero likelihood that the 
defendant will prevail on one ground or another. 
 
 Accordingly, the value of any license will be reduced by the probability that the 
patent owner will not prevail at trial.  Suppose that patent owner P and potential 
licensee L1 are negotiating a license to a patented technology that is part of a product 
L1 is selling.  Suppose further that L1 values the technology at $10 million and that 
the parties believe that it is 50% likely that P’s patent will be held valid and 
infringed at trial.  P and L1 would typically agree to a license of approximately $10 
million × 50% = $5 million, which represents a discount on the full price to 
compensate for the uncertainty that is endemic to patent litigation.35 
 
 Now imagine that P files suit and prevails at trial against a second infringer, L2, 
that makes a product similar to L1’s.  Once P’s patent has been found valid and 
infringed, the court must assess damages against L2.36  In order to do so, one of the 
court’s principal sources of information would be the license that P negotiated with 
L1.  This license is the very first Georgia-Pacific factor; but more than that, it 
represents (to the court) the market’s valuation of the patented technology.  Given 
the difficulty of accurately estimating the value of patented technology from expert 
reports and pricing information alone, one would expect courts to seize upon this 
type of market-based indicator.  Indeed, this is what courts typically do.  Past 
                                                 
35 To be sure, this simplified model elides many factors, including the possibility that the parties 
would face asymmetric stakes in litigation, asymmetric costs, holdup problems, or any number of 
other variables.  This stripped-down analysis is offered in support of a single point: that the value 
of any patent license will be discounted to reflect the uncertainty surrounding whether the patent 
will in fact be held valid and infringed.  Adding further complexity and detail to the model will not 
alter that fact. 
36 Damages are of course a jury question; our reference to “the court” is meant to include both the 
jury’s calculation and the judge’s involvement in designing jury instructions, allowing (or not 
allowing) evidence of damages, or adjudicating motions for additur or remittitur. 
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licenses of the same or similar technology to similarly situated licensees are 
considered highly reliable indicia of a patent’s value, and courts commonly award 
damages in the range of prior licenses.  Here, then, the court would likely award 
damages against L2 and to P of approximately $5 million in accordance with the 
license that P and L1 negotiated. 
 
 Yet a damages award of $5 million would be error.  The appropriate amount of 
damages the licensing fee that the parties would have negotiated had they agreed 
that the patent was valid and infringed.  That figure is $10 million—the full value 
of the patented technology to L1.  The $5 million license is the full value of the 
technology discounted by the probability that the patent will be held invalid or not 
infringed.  It is a matter of black-letter patent law that the court must assess damages 
based upon a hypothetical negotiation in which the patent was assumed to be valid 
and infringed.  A court cannot simply treat an actual license as if it were granted 
pursuant to a negotiation in which both parties viewed the patent as valid and 
infringed.  It is rarely the case that both parties to a license will view infringement 
and validity as certainties, and indeed such cases may not even exist.  The court 
cannot rely upon the $5 million license between P and L1 as if it represents the 
underlying value of the patent stripped of all uncertainty. 
 
 Accordingly, when courts use existing licenses to assess damages, they will 
inevitably undervalue the patents in suit.  Every licensing amount will be 
discounted to reflect some probability that the patent will be held invalid or not 
infringed.  If that probability is greater than zero, the licensing fee will be less than 
the value of the underlying patented technology.  Only in the rare case when the 
parties agree that the patent is 100% likely to be held valid and infringed will the 
license provide an accurate guide to damages.  Otherwise, the license will represent 
only some proportion of the overall value the court is attempting to determine. 
 
 Nor can the court back out the parties’ true value simply by scrutinizing the 
license.  Even if the parties did agree upon a value for the patent and a probability 
of success at trial—and they likely did not—the license will not reveal this 
information.  The license will almost certainly include only one dollar figure: the 
amount of the license itself.  If two parties negotiate a license for $5 million, the 
court will have no way to determine whether the parties believed that the patented 
technology was worth $5 million and the patent was 100% likely to be held valid 
and infringed, or whether the technology was worth $10 million and the patent was 
50% likely to be valid and infringed, or some other arrangement. 
 
 This opacity presents a fundamental problem for any court that seeks to use 
existing licenses as guides to patent damages.  The court cannot determine the true 
value of the patent from the license, and furthermore it would be error for the court 
to simply use the value of the existing license as a measure of damages.  The next 
section explains why. 
 
B.  DISTORTED FEES IN FUTURE LICENSING 
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 The last section showed that licensing-based damages can lead to under-
compensation by failing to account for uncertainties that shape license fees.  A 
corollary is that this under-compensation will generally translate into reduced fees 
in future patent licensing.  As already noted, licensing terms are shaped principally 
by the parties’ expectations of how litigation would play out.  Thus, if the parties 
expect damages to undercompensate, then this provides prospective licensees with 
a bargaining chip for securing lower license fees than the patentee would ordinarily 
accept.   
 
 Consider an example.  There are two prospective users – L1 and L2 – that would 
like to license a patent owned by a patent holder, PH.  For each prospective user, 
the value of a license is $100K.  For the sake of simplicity, assume each of their 
intended applications clearly reads on the patent (i.e., there is no uncertainty on the 
infringement question), but the patent may or may not be valid.  Specifically, all 
parties believe that there is a 50% probability that the patent will be held valid.  
Suppose that PH is initially approached by L1 to strike a licensing deal.  Since there 
is no prior licensing deal on which to base damages, they presume that damages 
would be assigned somewhat randomly, but with an expected value equal to the full 
value of a license ($100K).37  However, knowing that there is a 50% chance that 
the patent is invalid, they discount this amount by half, and thus agree on a fee of 
$50K. 
 
 Now suppose that, after this agreement is formed, L2 approaches PH to strike a 
second licensing deal.  The parties expect that a court would base damages on the 
prior agreement, providing an award of $50K.  However, as before, the parties 
believe that PH has only a 50% chance of winning, so they discount the expected 
award by half, resulting in a license fee of $25K.  Thus, even though there are no 
material differences between the licensees, the second agreement results in lower 
fees.  By contrast, if the courts did not adhere to the licensing-based damages 
standard, then nothing would change in the second agreement; the negotiated fee 
would be the same $50K.   
 
 The problem is that, by basing damages on the prior license fee, the courts fail 
to filter out the “uncertainty discount”—the percentage by which the license fee 
was reduced to reflect PH’s uncertain litigation prospects—from the prior 
agreement.  The damages award subsumes this uncertainty discount.  But 
subsequent licensing negotiations also occur under uncertainty—as before, PH is 
not certain to win in court—resulting in a second round of discounting.  As a 
consequence, the fee reached in the second agreement carries two iterative 
discounts—one reflecting uncertainty in the present agreement, and one reflecting 
uncertainty in the first agreement.  Of course, there is no good reason that the fee 
                                                 
37 This assumption is not at all essential to the argument; it just makes things simpler.  Even if 
expected damages were different from $100K, subsequent licensing would still result in lower 
fees. 
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charged in one agreement should reflect the uncertainty faced in another.  But this 
nonsensical result is nevertheless a rational response to licensing-based damages. 
  
 Even if there is no uncertainty about the patent holder’s litigation prospects, a 
prior licensing agreement may come back to haunt the patent holder.  This can occur 
when efficient licensing would involve significant price discrimination.  Consider 
another example.  A patent holder is initially approached by a prospective licensee, 
Beta, who values a license at $100K.  As in the preceding example, suppose that 
the court’s damages, if not based on any prior agreements, would equal the full 
licensing value ($100K) in expected value.  But in this case suppose that the patent 
holder is certain to win if it brings an infringement claim.  Thus the patent holder 
can extract a fee of the full $100K from Beta.38   
 
 After this agreement is formed, another prospective user, Alpha, approaches the 
patent holder.  Alpha attaches much more value to the patented invention—say, 
because it provides a larger incremental benefit when applied to Alpha’s product—
and is willing to pay as much as $500K for a license.  If the parties expected 
damages to equal the license value—as they did in the first agreement—then the 
patent holder could extract a fee of $500K.  However, this is not possible if damages 
will be based on the prior agreement.  In this case, the base for damages is the 
$100K fee—just one fifth of what the patent holder would get but for the prior 
agreement.  In fact, even if Alpha were held to have willfully infringed, treble 
damages would be just $300K, still substantially less than what the patent holder 
could ordinarily get.39  In either case, licensing-based damages inadvertently 
compel the patent holder to give Alpha a steep discount. 
 
 In fact, the same problem could cut in the opposite direction, benefitting patent 
holders and injuring defendants.  This may be particularly pronounced in situations 
in which a defendant has unintentionally infringed the patent and damages are 
likely to be based on the terms of a prior agreement that happened to involve a 
relatively high royalty rate. To illustrate, imagine that, in the above Alpha-Beta 
example, Alpha had been the first to approach the patent holder, and thus the first 
licensing agreement stipulated a $500K fee.  Now suppose that Beta later 
unintentionally infringed the patent.  Based on the prior agreement with Alpha, a 
court would require Beta to pay damages of $500K—five times more than it would 
otherwise pay. 
 
 To synthesize what is going on here, suppose there are two licensing agreements 
involving the same patent, one occurring at time t = 1, and the other occurring at 
time t = 2.  For each t, there is a distinct licensee, Lt.  Then let Vt > 0 denote Lt’s 
valuation for a license, and let pt denote the probability that the patent holder would 
                                                 
38 Alternatively, they could split the surplus in some way, as contemplated in the discriminatory 
bargaining outcomes depicted in Figure 1.  But for simplicity, we assume for now that the patent 
holder can extract the full licensing surplus. 
39 35 U.S.C. § 284 (INSERT YEAR) (stating that in cases of willful infringement, “the court may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”). 
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win an infringement suit against Lt.  Note that 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1, since this is a probability.  
Now assume that, if damages are awarded ad hoc, they will equal the defendant’s 
license valuation (Vt) in expected value.  Let Ft denote the fee charged in agreement 
t, which will depend on the variables just defined.  In the first agreement, there is 
no prior deal that would influence damages.  Thus, expected damages would be V1, 
resulting in the fee 
 
F1 = p1V1 
 
 This says that the fee in the first agreement is simply equal to expected damages 
(L1’s valuation), discounted by the patent holder’s probability of winning.  If courts 
did not rely on licenses in calculating damages, the fee in the second would be 
analogous—it would be p2V2—because the parties to this agreement would expect 
damages to be V2 if the patent holder won in court.  But if the prior fee F1 would 
instead be the basis for damages, then the fee charged in the second agreement 
would be 
 
F2 = p2F1 = p2 × p1V1 
 
 Here we can see both of the problems that came up in the preceding examples.  
First, F2 nonsensically reflects uncertainty from the first agreement, as captured by 
the fact that it includes p1 as a factor.  This discounts the fee based on uncertainty 
that is entirely impertinent to the agreement in question.  The second problem is 
that F2 reflects the valuation of the wrong licensee—it includes the term V1 rather 
than V2, even though the former is entirely irrelevant to the present agreement.  This 
could either increase or decrease the fee depending on how V1 and V2 compare.  
Overall, F2 is lower than the proper fee (p2V2) when p1V1 < V2, and it is higher 
when p1V1 > V2.40   
 
 An implication of this analysis is that, even if there have been many prior 
licensing deals involving a common royalty rate, it does not follow that the court 
should use the established royalty as a measure of damages.  The established royalty 
was likely discounted by the parties’ uncertainty about whether the patent would 
be held valid and infringed.  If the court were to apply the established royalty as 
damages, it would preserve this discount and award the infringer the same discount 
it might have negotiated under conditions of uncertainty.  This would be a 
nonsensical result, for the court has just resolved that uncertainty.  Preserving this 
uncertainty-based discount limits the plaintiff’s recovery based on factors that have 
nothing to do with the intrinsic value of a license or the commercial injury suffered 
by the plaintiff.  As such, there is no reason that such factors should influence the 
remedy.   
 
IV.  IMPACT ON LICENSING INCENTIVES 
  
                                                 
40 One obvious caveat is that, unless the second licensee has unintentionally infringed, it will never 
agree to pay more than V2.  Thus, if p2p1V1 > V2, then F2 would be truncated to V2. 
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 The preceding section explained how licensing-based damages may distort 
damages awards and, by extension, the terms of licensing agreements.  These first-
order effects do not involve a direct change in the allocation of patent rights; they 
simply alter the amount of money that changes hands in the course of licensing or 
litigation.  However, parties will anticipate these effects ex ante and adjust their 
conduct accordingly, and this second-order effect may indeed influence how patent 
rights are allocated.  Thus, the more serious concern with licensing-based damages 
is that they tend to distort licensing behavior and thereby undermine the efficient 
dissemination of patent rights.  This section addresses some of these adverse 
incentive problems. 
 
A.  DIMINISHED LICENSING 
 
 A patent is only as strong as the remedies that can be obtained to enforce it.41  
Thus, with the intention of maintaining the strongest rights possible, patent holders 
would not want to do anything that might undermine their ability to receive a strong 
remedy in the future.  When the courts rely on licensing terms as a basis for 
damages, patent holders influence future remedies whenever they strike a licensing 
deal.  As such, they have a strong incentive to make their patents appear valuable 
by licensing on relatively lucrative terms, ensuring future remedies will be 
comparatively strong.  Unfortunately, this kind of posturing will tend to require that 
the patent holder forgo efficient licensing deals that can only be reached on more 
modest terms.  The result is that the licensing-based damages standard diminishes 
the number of efficient licensing deals that are executed, thereby creating 
deadweight loss.  
 
 If efficient licensing would involve a significant degree of price discrimination, 
then licensing-based damages undermine efficiency by diminishing the patent 
holder’s willingness to price discriminate.  In such a case, there are a number of 
different licensees willing to pay variable amounts.  But if the patent holder 
transacts with the low-valuation licensees, this may prevent it from collecting 
satisfactory fees in transactions with the high-valuation licensees.  This would also 
undermine the damages the patent holder could obtain in future litigation.  Thus, in 
an effort to avoid these outcomes, the patent holder may rationally (albeit 
regrettably) refuse to license to prospective users who are not willing to pay a 
relatively large amount for a license.   
 
 A principal problem is that, at the time of licensing, a patent holder likely cannot 
predict how the present agreement will impact it in the future, and as such it may 
prefer to remain cautious and accept only a relatively high royalty rate in the 
interim.  This derives from uncertainty about its future licensing and litigation 
prospects.  For instance, a patent holder may be uncertain as to the various ways a 
                                                 
41 Masur, supra note 5, at 127; Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An 
Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 388 (2009) (“[W]ith no potential enforcement by the owner 
of the IP, potential licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing at will.”). 
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patent could be usefully applied, or of which firms might be interested in licensing.  
(In fact, it is unlikely that a typical patent holder has perfect information about these 
things.)  For example, at the time a patent is granted, the patent holder may suspect 
that there are many possible applications, but it may have so far identified only a 
few of them.  In this case, a patent holder does not want to establish a low royalty 
rate early in the patent term only to learn later on that its invention has some much 
more valuable alternative applications.  This would give the courts the mistaken 
impression that the patent license is not particularly valuable, allowing licensees 
using the more valuable application to get a steep discount.  As such, a patent holder 
may be relatively cautious or inflexible early in the term until it has a better 
understanding of the patent’s applications, even if it could begin striking some 
mutually beneficial licensing deals soon after the grant date. 
 
 Another possibility is that both the patent holder and licensees may be uncertain 
how valuable the licensed invention will be in practice.  For example, if a new 
software program is added to a smartphone, it may be unclear ex ante how 
consumers will respond to the addition and, by extension, how it will affect sales 
of the smartphone.  On one hand, a prospective licensee does not want to pay too 
much for a license, for the patented technology may not prove particularly helpful.  
On the other hand, the patent holder does not want to accept too low a royalty, for 
if it turns out that the application is quite helpful, it may be compelled to offer future 
licensees the same low rate.  This reflects the fact that a prospective licensee is 
thinking only about the deal in question, but the patent holder must think about how 
the deal will affect its future licensing and litigation prospects.  This could lead to 
delays in licensing or to a complete breakdown in negotiations. 
 
 More generally, licensing-based damages will tend to replicate the deadweight 
loss problem that results from linear pricing, which was illustrated in Figure 1.  This 
is not because it induces a patent holder to charge identical royalties to all comers.  
Rather, it will tend to induce a patent holder to choose some minimum royalty rate 
below which it refuses to license, and then bargain only with those firms willing to 
match or exceed this threshold.  Because there are likely to be some mutually 
beneficial licensing opportunities requiring a lower royalty rate, this creates 
deadweight loss by foreclosing some efficient transactions. 
 
 Diminished future license fees are not the only thing that may deter the patent 
holder from licensing at a relatively modest royalty rate.  The patent holder may 
have a strong interest in excluding a direct competitor from using the patented 
technology, and it may be able to do this only if it refuses to license at anything less 
than a high royalty rate, or perhaps only if it declines to license at all.  As noted in 
an earlier section, it may be impossible for a patent holder and a direct competitor 
to reach mutually beneficial licensing terms.  This is not surprising, since the right 
to exclude competitors is a principal source of patent value, and many firms do not 
license their patents to direct competitors.  However, it may nevertheless be 
possible to license a patent to non-competitors, as the patented invention may have 
useful applications within non-competing products.  In this case, market efficiency 
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would involve licensing to non-rivals, but not to the competitor.  However, the 
patent holder may rationally refuse to license to anyone, for licensing might 
establish a royalty rate that it would never accept from the competitor, which would 
provide its rival with leverage in future litigation.  That is, licensing might prevent 
the patent holder from getting an adequate remedy if the competitor went on to 
infringe the patent.   
 
 Licensing-based damages need not always work to a patent holder’s detriment, 
however, notwithstanding that they result in fewer licensing transactions.  If the 
patent holder earns significantly larger fees but strikes fewer licensing deals, the 
former effect may dominate the latter, leading overall licensing revenues to 
increase.  This can happen if the market value of a license declines after the patent 
has been licensed at a relatively high rate—say, because a number of competing 
alternatives entered the licensing market—so that a licensee in an arm’s length 
bargain would subsequently pay only a small fee.  In this case, the patent holder’s 
best strategy may be to rely on a “wait and sue” approach, sitting on its rights and 
using its high-established royalty to secure supra-competitive fees from 
unintentional infringers.  In this case, the patent holder does not want to bargain at 
arm’s length, even though this would likely result in more deals getting done, 
because it could garner only small fees in these agreements.  Rather, it prefers to 
bargain only when it has leverage—liability for damages that will be based on the 
high prior royalty—with which it can extract excessive fees. 
 
B.  ROYALTY GAMESMANSHIP 
 
 When patent owners do agree to license their IP, they will also have incentives 
to obfuscate or distort the terms of those licenses.  If courts will look to existing 
licenses to determine patent damages, then patent owners have every reason to 
structure those licenses such that the price appears to be as high as possible.  There 
are a variety of strategies that patent owners might employ, and here we canvas a 
sampling of them. 
 
 First, the patent owner might attempt to bundle other goods along with the 
patent as part of the license in exchange for a higher licensing price.42  The patent 
license might be drafted to include other forms of IP, such as trademarks or trade 
secrets relevant to the patented technology.  It might include the provision of tacit 
knowledge, such as a promise by the patent owner to direct its scientists and 
engineers to help the licensee implement the patented technology.43  Or it might be 
paired with a future promise of some type, such as an unstated agreement to 
separately cross-license some other technology owned by the licensee. 
 
                                                 
42 Masur, supra note 5, at 142. 
43 See generally Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1516 (2012) 
(explaining that patent licenses can facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge). 
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 These types of maneuvers are not necessarily welfare-diminishing, though they 
may result in future patent infringers being forced to pay excessive damages at trial.  
However, the process of negotiating them could increase transaction costs.  And if 
the parties are not able to agree upon the higher price to be paid for these additional 
considerations, the result could be that the opportunity to license the patent is 
forgone entirely. 
 
 At least in theory, courts police existing licenses for this type of strategy.  The 
Federal Circuit has instructed trial courts that they are not to use existing licenses 
as a measure of damages when those licenses include consideration other than 
merely a license to the patent itself.44  In practice, it is difficult to know how 
successful these policing efforts really are.  But even if courts are entirely 
successful at weeding out patent licenses that include inducements beyond the 
patent itself, that will only solve one problem—the problem of inflated damages 
verdicts.  In so doing, it will actually heighten the incentives of patent owners to 
negotiate licenses that include more than just the right to use the patented 
technology.  Patent owners will understand that if they can lard up the license with 
other considerations, courts will not rely upon the license as a guide to future 
damages.  And because the use of existing licenses typically leads to 
underestimations of patent damages, patent owners will be eager to take their own 
existing licenses out of consideration.  The result could be a proliferation of 
needlessly complicated licenses involving considerations that neither party values 
especially highly—and thus excessive transaction costs. 
 
 A second strategy that a patent owner might employ is to engineer the sequence 
of licenses it negotiates, with the highest-value licenses negotiated first (and before 
any trial occurs).  For instance, low-volume licensees—parties who only plan to 
use the patented technology in a small number of units or over a short time period—
might well be willing to pay higher per-unit prices than higher-volume users.  
Because the patent license will consume a lower proportion of a low-volume user’s 
overall budget, that user might be more willing to settle quickly on a higher price 
rather than consuming greater resources haggling over a lower one. 
 
 There is nothing inherently problematic about strategically sequencing 
licensing negotiations, but again, as with the tactics detailed above, any additional 
complications introduced into the licensing process could derail parties from ever 
reaching agreement.  For instance, imagine a situation in which a large-volume 
potential licensee wishes to negotiate a license to a valuable patent.  The patent 
owner might prefer to delay consummating this license until after a trial concludes, 
or until after the patent owner has negotiated a separate license with another party 
                                                 
44 See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In sum, the district 
court erred by considering ResQNet’s re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust upward the 
reasonable royalty without any factual findings that accounted for the technological and economic 
differences between those licenses and the ′075 patent.”); see also John Elmore, The Technological 
Comparability of Patent License Agreements, 46 LES NOUVELLES 115, 116 (2011) (“[C]ase law 
cautions that patent license agreements providing substantial non-patent benefits or multiple patents 
may not be comparable to a ‘straight’ patent license.”). 
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for the same technology.  In the meantime, the potential licensee—not wishing to 
be left in limbo—might adopt a different (and inferior) technology or simply drop 
the relevant line of business entirely.  The result would be needless social costs 
driven entirely by the patent owner’s desire to structure its licensing behavior in 
light of courts’ misuse of licenses in assessing damages. 
 
 Third and finally, a patent owner might attempt to structure the terms of a 
licensing agreement to make the license appear more lucrative on a per-unit basis 
than it actually is.  There are a variety of ways to accomplish this, but the general 
idea is that the license is written as if it covers fewer units or a shorter period of 
time than it does in fact.45  Accordingly, the license appears more valuable on a 
per-unit basis to outside observers.  For instance, suppose that a firm has been 
infringing a patent from 2012 through 2016.  Imagine that the parties are willing to 
agree to a license of $10 million per year of infringing activity, or $40 million total.  
The patent owner might instead suggest that the license to be written to cover the 
years 2014 through 2016 only, yet for the same amount of $40 million.  To a court 
(or a future licensee), the licensing price would appear to be $20 million per year, 
rather than $10 million per year.  The parties might then arrive at an understanding 
(which they do not memorialize) that the patent owner will not sue the licensee for 
infringement from 2012 to 2014.  Or the parties might simply rely upon the doctrine 
of laches to block suit for that period.46 
 
 A roughly equivalent strategy is to draft a license that intentionally understates 
the number of units it is meant to cover.  For instance, imagine that the patent owner 
and putative licensee agree that the licensee intends to use the patented technology 
in 10 million manufactured units and is willing to pay $4 per unit, or $40 million in 
total.  The parties might draft a license stating that the patent owner grants a license 
in exchange for a lump sum of $40 million.  The license might then further state 
that the parties “anticipate that the licensee will produce 5 million units”—which 
implies a price of $8 per unit.  This language could be drafted to be unenforceable: 
if the licensee produces more than 5 million units—which both parties expect will 
occur—that does not void the license or alter its terms.  For the licensee, nothing is 
lost.  And for the patent owner, the patented technology appears to be more valuable 
than it actually is. 
 
 Or, in the alternative, a licensor could include geographic or field-of-use 
restrictions that are meaningless to the particular licensee but make the license seem 
more valuable than it really is.47  For instance, a license granted to a firm that only 
does business in California could be written to state that it is “only valid in 
                                                 
45 See Layne S. Keele, Res“Q”ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of 
Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 228 
(2012) (describing this type of arrangement). 
46 See Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1298 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (discussing the legal standard for laches in patent cases). 
47 Masur, supra note 5, at 142. 
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California.”  Or a license granted to a firm that manufactures medical devices could 
be written to state that it “only applies to medical devices,” making it appear that a 
more general blanket license would be more expensive.  These sorts of tactics are 
not merely hypothetical.  There are several cases on record in which a patent 
defendant has alleged that a licensor has engaged in one or more of these tactics in 
an effort to inflate the perceived value of a patent license.48 
 
 Again, the primary result of these practices will likely be to inflate the prices 
that future licensees or infringers held liable at trial will be forced to pay.  Standing 
by itself, that may not create tremendous social loss.  But the process of negotiating 
such a license could involve greater transaction costs than would accrue if the 
parties were “playing it straight,” and in some cases the result might be a foregone 
licensing opportunity.  These are potentially significant social costs, generated by 
the ways in which courts use licenses to value patents.  
 
 The general theme of this section is that an arms-length market valuation of a 
good, such as a patent, is only as reliable as the parties negotiating it.  When one 
party has an incentive to strategically inflate or alter the terms of that license, the 
license can no longer be counted upon to provide accurate estimations of a patent’s 
value.  Moreover, the fact that licenses play such a central role in calculating patent 
damages—and the manner in which courts employ licenses in that calculation—
creates incentives for patent owners who are repeat players to manipulate licensing 
terms whenever possible.  The ripple effects of courts’ treatment of licenses are 
persistently negative. 
 
C.  CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT LICENSING 
 
 If patent licensees cannot inflate the value of the licenses they negotiate—or 
perhaps even if they can—they might respond by attempting to keep the licenses 
confidential.  If information regarding the licenses cannot be disclosed, then they 
cannot be used against the patentee to reduce damages at trial.  Patentees might thus 
protect licensing agreements with confidentiality provisions and non-disclosure 
guarantees in an effort to prevent them from being disclosed in the event that the 
licenses become relevant in future litigation. 
 
 In most cases, however, this strategy will not succeed.  For the most part, district 
courts have permitted discovery of prior licenses, even licenses protected by 
confidentiality agreements, when the licenses appear relevant to the question of 
                                                 
48 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (Motorola 
introduced as evidence of damages a license that it had negotiated with a smaller firm and that 
may have been inflated for purposes of driving up Microsoft’s damages); Ericsson, Inc. v. 
InterDigital Communications Corp., 418 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nokia accused InterDigital 
of artificially inflating the value of its patents to increase Nokia’s required payments); Masur, 
supra note 5, at 142–43 (describing these cases). 
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damages.49  (Of course, our argument is that these licenses are almost never relevant 
to the damages calculation, but courts do not yet subscribe to that view.)  In some 
cases, courts will issue a protective order that permits discovery of the documents 
but prevents the parties and their attorneys from further disclosing the information 
outside of the trial.50  In some cases, courts will prohibit discovery of prior licenses 
when the court does not believe that the licenses are highly probative of the 
damages issue before the court.51  At least one district court has also held that 
ongoing or unconsummated settlement and licensing negotiations involving the 
patents-in-suit are not discoverable.52  Accordingly, in some circumstances patent 
owners might be expected to delay finalizing licensing agreements until after the 
conclusion of a contemporaneous trial.  Nonetheless, our review of the case law 
leads us to conclude that existing licenses will be discoverable in the majority of 
cases. 
 
 Attempting to shield licenses with confidentiality agreements might be thought 
of as one species of the greater genus of methods that patentees might use to 
eliminate existing licenses as guides to damages.  As we observed in the preceding 
section, some patent holders might seek to render licenses useless as measures of 
damages by bundling them with other goods.  This is only a partial solution 
however, because the licensing price still represents a floor on the value of the 
patent.  It is similarly unlikely that patent owners will be able to shield licenses 
using confidentiality agreements, as we explain above.  But it is important to note 
that these methods are not mutually exclusive.  A patent owner could bundle a 
patent license with other goods, massage the license terms to make them appear 
more lucrative than they really are, and then attach a strict confidentiality guarantee 
to the agreement as well.  A patentee who pursues enough of these strategies 
simultaneously stands a good chance of convincing a court that the license is 
incomparable or worth more than it might appear. 
 
 Patent owners also have incentives to keep licenses confidential from other 
potential licensing partners, even under circumstances where divulging a license 
                                                 
49 E.g., Wyeth v. Orgenus Pharma Inc., No. 09-3235, 2010 WL 4117157  (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010); 
Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Bajul Imports, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-135 SNLJ, 2011 WL 976623 (E.D. Mo. 
Mar. 17, 2011); High Point SARL v. Spring Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2011 WL 
3241432, at *2 (D. Kan. Jul. 29, 2011); Clear with Computers, LLC v. Bergdorf Goodman, Inc., 
753 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Tex. 2010)). 
50 See, e.g., Cornell Research Foundation, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 223 F.R.D. 55, 67–68 
(N.D.N.Y 2003); Sprinturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 320, 322 
(E.D. Pa. 2003). 
51 E.g., Bayer AG v. Sony Electronics, 202 F.R.D. 404, page# (D. Del. 2001); Centillion Data 
Systems, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550 (S.D. Ind. 1999); Fenner Invs. Ltd. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., No. 608CV273, 2010 WL 1727916, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2010) (holding that 
ResQNet does not compel the admission of evidence relating to settlement agreements in prior 
litigation); Software Tree, LLC v. Red Hat, Inc., No. 609CV097, 2010 WL 2788202, at *4 (E.D. 
Tex. Jun. 24, 2010). 
52 Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2011 WL 1714304, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 
2011). 
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would ordinarily be in both parties’ interests.  For instance, imagine that a patent 
owner successfully negotiates a non-exclusive license with Firm A for $10 million.  
It then opens negotiations with Firm B, which is similarly situated to Firm A, and 
seeks royalties in the same amount.  If courts did not use licenses to set damages, it 
would be in the patent owner’s interest to divulge the existence and terms of its 
license to Firm A in the course of negotiations with Firm B.  The price of that 
license would provide a focal point for negotiations with Firm B and might well 
convince that firm to license on similar terms.53  The information revelation would 
similarly be in Firm B’s interests.  It might reduce the costs of negotiation and 
provide information about the activities of Firm B’s competitors.  More generally, 
additional information cannot possibly be harmful to Firm B. 
 
 But if courts will use licenses to calculate damages, the patent owner has a 
strong incentive not to disclose its prior license to Firm B.  Once Firm B observes 
the $10 million license between the patent owner and Firm A, it will believe that it 
likely faces only $10 million in potential liability should it lose at trial.  If Firm B 
believes that it has a realistic chance of prevailing at trial, it will only be willing to 
license the patent for less than $10 million.  (To be precise, as we noted in the 
preceding part, the value of the license will be discounted by the probability that 
the patent will be held invalid or not infringed at trial.)54 
 
 On the other hand, it is possible that courts’ use of licensing-based damages 
will actually encourage settlement in some cases.  The reason is that once the patent 
owner has licensed the patent for the first time, the owner will become more 
pessimistic about the damages it will likely be awarded at trial.  For instance, to 
continue this example, imagine that the patent owner and Firm B agree that the 
patent is 50% likely to be valid and infringed, and that in a vacuum a court would 
likely award $20 million if the patent owner prevailed at trial.  Under these 
circumstances, the likely licensing price is $20 million × 50% = $10 million.  But 
if the license with Firm A exists and is likely to be divulged at trial, the patent owner 
will understand that its likely damages at trial might actually be $10 million (the 
license value) × 50% = $5 million.  While Firm B would be willing to license for 
any amount less than $10 million (its expected outcome at trial), the patent owner 
would be willing to license for any amount greater than $5 million.  The patent 
owner thus has lower expectations than Firm B about the likely outcome at trial.55  
This opens up $5 million in bargaining space.56  Under these conditions, the parties 
are more likely to reach agreement. 
                                                 
53 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW (2015). 
54 Supra Part II; Masur, supra note 5, at 129–32. 
55 Cf. Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV 
(forthcoming 2017) (predicting that criminal cases will be plea bargained—that is, settle—more 
frequently if defendants gain full knowledge of the strength of the prosecution’s case). 
56 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (describing the settlement bargaining game); see 
also John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973) (same); cf. 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971) 
(same). 
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 Whether courts’ misuse of licensing-based damages will encourage or 
discourage settlement in any given case is therefore highly contextual.  But the 
more general problem with patent licenses being made confidential is that existing, 
publicly known licenses represent a public good.  Even if licenses are not useful in 
calculating damages, they are potentially very useful as guideposts for other 
licenses.  One of the difficulties in arranging efficient patent licensing is that the 
terms of existing licenses are often not well known, so parties struggle to find 
benchmarks for the deals they wish to strike.  The result is an increase in the cost 
of bargaining and undoubtedly some licensing deals that do not occur because of 
bargaining breakdowns. 
 
 The more licenses are made public, the greater the benefits to third parties.  
Some larger firms have attempted to assemble large licensing databases as a means 
of providing this type of information, but those efforts have been halting and may 
also be biased by the firm’s own interests.  As a general matter, it would be 
beneficial if more licenses became public as a matter of course, or even as a result 
of litigation.  If patent owners respond to the use of licenses to calculate royalties 
by attempting to hide licenses, the pool of potentially valuable licensing 
information will diminish. 
  
V.  CONCLUSION: PROPOSED REFORM 
 
 To avoid the problems created by the licensing-based damages standard, we 
offer a simple proposal: stop using it.  Even if the litigated patent has previously 
been licensed to one or more third parties, the terms of those agreements should 
generally be ignored when fashioning a remedy.  That is, damages should be 
assigned through the same calculus employed in cases where there are no prior 
agreements to use as a baseline.  This ensures that remedies are not influenced by 
expectations about remedies, and that licensing markets will not be distorted by 
concerns that today’s dealings might undermine tomorrow’s disputes. 
 
 Because judicial reliance on prior licensing agreements is so widespread, we 
anticipate that some readers will be skeptical of our proposal.  At first blush, it may 
appear to understate the practical complexities that distinguish patent practice from 
patent scholarship.  But any such criticism rests implicitly on one or more fallacious 
assumptions.  The first and most important fallacy, which we have already exposed 
in detail, involves the presumption that prior licensing agreements are likely to 
provide an apt measure of damages.  We have demonstrated why, for a number of 
reasons, this presumption is false.  It rests on a naïve and grossly over-simplified 
conception of patent licensing transactions.  It also fails to appreciate the economic 
complexities that distinguish them from purchases of conventional goods or 
services, in particular the influence of the courts on the terms of trade.  Indeed, even 
if the relevant commercial circumstances are similar in a prior agreement, it does 
not follow that the royalty rate negotiated in that agreement would provide a good 
measure of damages in the next case. The terms of the prior agreement were likely 
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distorted by the parties’ uncertainty about litigation, and such concerns have no 
place shaping the successful plaintiff’s recovery. 
 
 The second fallacy is often characterized as “looking under the lamppost.”57  
This involves relying on a particular system or practice not because it is likely to 
be effective, but because it simple.  We have demonstrated that this is precisely 
what courts are doing when they rely upon previously negotiated licenses.  Yet 
although this approach might economize on judicial decision costs, it is thoroughly 
misguided.  In any normative theory of patent damages, the objective cannot simply 
be to choose the standard that makes it easiest to come up with a number.  Rather, 
the goal should be to adopt the standard that best serves patent policy interests. 
 
 The patent courts have already made it clear that a remedial standard is not 
appropriate solely on the ground that it is easy.  For example, the Federal Circuit 
recently held that the 25-percent “rule of thumb” is generally not an appropriate 
standard for computing reasonable royalty damages.58  Under the 25-percent rule, 
courts presumed that reasonable royalties should be set at 25% of the infringer’s 
revenues, absent some indication to the contrary.59  The standard is clearly easy to 
implement; it is not meaningfully different from a statutory damages rule.  But 
many scholars—particularly economists—derided the standard for its arbitrariness 
and the courts’ apparent disinterest in considering factual issues that shed interest 
on the proper measure of compensation.60  The Federal Circuit agreed, denouncing 
the rule of thumb as “fundamentally flawed” and generally inadmissible.61  The 
same logic—that the goal of a damages standard is to promote patent policy and 
not simply to come up with a number—suggests that the licensing-based damages 
standard is not likely to be effective simply because it is practicable.  And as we 
have shown above, the use of an improper standard can create real social costs. 
 
 The third fallacy, which is similar, is that a damages standard based on existing 
licenses is likely to elicit better results because it is more predictable—even if it is 
wrong.  In other words, proponents of this fallacy might argue that a bright-line rule 
is superior to a standard, even if the rule has a known bias.  It is  of course true that 
calculating damages based upon the value of the underlying technology—rather 
than using existing licenses—will necessarily require some speculation and involve 
some degree of uncertainty.62  Under normal circumstances, this might be a 
                                                 
57 The expression comes from an old fable. A drunkard is searching for his keys underneath a 
lamppost.  A police officer asks, “are you sure this is where you lost your keys?”  The drunkard 
replies, “no, but it’s easier to look here.” 
58 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court now 
holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed 
tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”) 
59E.g., Thomas Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement 
Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 725, 732 (2011). 
60 Id. at 733. 
61 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315. 
62 See generally Taylor, supra note X. 
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disadvantage given that the goal is to encourage licensing.  Typically, the greater 
the level of certainty over likely outcomes at trial, the greater the likelihood that the 
parties will be able to reach a settlement—here, a license.63  But that is not the case 
for patent licenses.  In this context, certainty about how courts will use licenses—
that is, certainty that they will use existing licenses to calculate damages—is 
precisely what deters patent holders from licensing.  The more certain an owner is 
that a court will use a license to calculate future damages, the greater the incentive 
for the patent owner to obscure the value of the license or refrain from licensing 
entirely, for all the reasons we detail above. 
 
 The uncertainty involved in calculating damages on the basis of the value of the 
underlying technology—rather than using existing licenses as a guide—is by no 
means a feature.  However, so long as damages are not biased on average, patentees 
will believe that they are likely to receive fair compensation in expectation.  Patent 
owners and putative infringers will have the proper incentives.  If damages 
calculations based upon the value of the technology do turn out to be biased—that 
is, if they under-or over-compensate on average—then certainly courts should 
attempt to reform their practices.  But it is undeniably better to tolerate some 
uncertainty in calculating damages than to rely upon a methodology that will 
reliably generate wrong answers. 
 
 The fourth and final fallacy, which is implicit in some potential critiques of our 
proposal, is that a patent damages standard that relies upon prior licenses will not 
undermine patent licensing so long as successful plaintiffs appear to be adequately 
compensated in most final judgments.  This type of argument proceeds as follows: 
among the set of cases that are litigated to judgment, successful plaintiffs seem to 
get adequate compensation in most cases.  Therefore, licensing markets will operate 
efficiently, because potential-infringers know that they will have to provide 
sufficient compensation if they refuse to pay an adequate price for a license.   
 
 This argument is beset by a selection bias problem, however.  It may be that 
there is actually much less licensing going on, because patentees—wanting to keep 
their recovery prospects as strong as possible—are refusing to license at anything 
less than a high royalty rate, even though they could reach additional mutually 
beneficial agreements on more modest terms. 
 
 As we have already noted, one possible exception to our proposal is a patent 
that has been widely licensed on common terms to many different licensees, as with 
patents subject to a RAND commitment.64  But the standard will be inapt even in 
these cases if the established royalty was materially affected by pre-litigation 
                                                 
63 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1 
(1984). 
64 See note __, supra. 
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uncertainty about whether the patent would be held valid and infringed.65  Thus, if 
the court uses the established royalty as the measure of damages, it allows 
expectations about the plaintiff’s litigation prospects to influence the remedy. 
 
 Patent licensing markets are complex, and there are many variables that 
determine which terms are mutually beneficial in a particular licensing relationship.  
The optimal royalty might be higher in one exchange and lower in another.  As a 
consequence, economic efficiency requires that patent holders vary licensing terms 
among different transactions so as to maximize the number of mutually beneficial 
deals that are reached.  But this paper demonstrates that the courts unwittingly 
discourage this kind of efficient discrimination when they base patent damages on 
prior licensing agreements involving the litigated patent.  This tethers patent 
holders to the terms of their private dealings, leaving them wary of accepting 
anything less than a high royalty rate, even if this means foregoing many mutually 
beneficial licensing opportunities that could be reached only on more modest terms.  
While administratively convenient in the small number of cases that are actually 
litigated to judgment, it creates problems in virtually all patent licensing, and thus 
substantially undermines the efficient commercialization of patented inventions.  
Eradicating the licensing-based damages standard would benefit not only patent 
holders, but also prospective licensees and their consumers. 
                                                 
65 As noted earlier in Section X, since the parties have litigated the dispute to judgment, it is probably 
safe to infer that there was significant pre-judgment uncertainty.  One might counter that the present 
dispute may have involved some uncertain elements that were not present in the prior agreement.  
For example, perhaps the defendant’s product is different from those of nonparty licensees, and the 
infringement question is less obvious here.  But, of course, such distinctions cast doubt on the 
comparability of the prior licensing deals. 
